Sun Tzu & Clausewitz: compared

Read “Sun Tzu & Clausevitz: compared” by Michael L. Handel of U.S. Army War College and practiced it on “Rome: Total war” game for several days thanks to no internet connection :-)

Sun Tzu (544 - 496 BC)

• “… in war the best policy is to take a state intact”
• “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”
• The musical notes are only five in number but their melodies are so numerous that on cannot hear them all.
• The primary colors are only five in number but their combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all.
• The flavors are only five in number but their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all.
• In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all.
• For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as that of interlocked wings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?
• That which depends on me, I can do; that which depends on the enemy cannot be certain.
• Therefore it is said that one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so.
• Of the five elements, none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none last forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes.
• These are the strategist’s keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand.
• “In the art of war there are no fixed rules.”
• “Do not allow your enemies to get together.
• … Look into the matter of his alliances and cause them to be severed and dissolved. If an enemy has alliances, the problem is grave and the enemy’s position strong; if he has no alliances the problem is minor and the enemy’s position weak.”
• “… is of vital importance to the state; the province of life and death; and road to survival and ruin. It is mandatory that it will be thoroughly studied.”
• “If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight.”
• A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor the dead be brought back to life.
• Therefore, the enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus the state is kept secure and the army preserved.
• And therefore it is said that the enlightened rulers deliberate upon the plans, and good generals execute them.
• And therefore the general who in advancing does not seek personal fame, and in withdrawing is not concerned with avoiding punishment, but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state… Few such are to be had.
• No evil is greater than commands of the sovereign from the court.
• He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.
• To make appointments is the province of the Sovereign; to decide on battle, that of the general.
• There are occasions when the commands of the sovereign need not be obeyed.
• When you see the correct course, act; do not wait for orders.
• Now the elements of the art of war are first, measurement of space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory.
• Quantities derive from measurement, figures from quantities, comparisons from figures, and victory from comparisons.
• By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of moral peril.
• When one treats the people with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and all will be happy to serve their leaders.
• Where the army is, prices are high; when prices are high the wealth of the people is exhausted. When wealth is exhausted the peasantry will be affected with urgent exactions.
• If war drags on without cessation men and women will resent not being able to marry, and will be distressed by the burdens of transportation.
• For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. Your aim must be to take All-under-heaven intact.
• … Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.
• The resort to warfare was an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of wen (the arts of peace). Consequently it should be a last resort, and it required justification both at the time and in the record.
• In old China, war was too complex a matter to be left to the fighting man, however well trained he might be. Its objectives was not victory but the reestablishment of order, and for this the arts of peace were equally necessary.
• “the best policy in war is to take a state incact.”
• He who knows the art of direct and indirect approach will be victorious. Such is the art of maneuvering.
• Go into emptiness, strike voids, bypass what he defends, hit him where he doesn’t expect you.
• Thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing you may set out after he does and arrive before him. One able to do this understands the strategy of the direct and the indirect.
• He who wishes to snatch an advantage takes a devious and distant route and makes of it the short way.
• Do not thwart an enemy returning homewards.
• To a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape.
• Show him there is a road to safety, and so create in his mind the idea that there is an alternative to death. Then strike
• Do not press an enemy at bay.
• It is military doctrine that an encircling force must leave a gap to show the surrounded troops there is a way out, so that they will not be determined to fight to the death.
• Throw them [his own troops] into a situation where there is no escape and they will display immortal courage.
• Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. Thus while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged.
• Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.
• Speed is the essence of war.
• That the one thing esteemed is divine swiftness.
• Therefore at first be shy as a maiden. When the enemy gives you an opening be swift as a hare and he will be unable to withstand you.
• If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There, I will be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straits.
• When he is united, divide him.
• The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few.
• And when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak everywhere.
• He will be unable to fathom where my chariots will actually go out, or where my infantry will actually follow up, and therefore he will disperse and will have to guard against one everywhere. Consequently, his force will be scattered and weak, and his strength divided and dissipated, and at the place I engage him I can use a large host against his isolated units.
• Now when a Hegemonic King attacks a powerful state he makes it impossible for the enemy to concentrate. He overawes the enemy and prevents his allies from joining him.
• In attacking a great state, if you can divide your enemy’s forces, your strength will be more than sufficient.
• Concentrate your forces against the enemy and from a distance of a thousand li you can kill his general. This is described as the ability to attain one’s aim in an artful and ingenious manner. S
• He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious.
• Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him; when five times his strength attack him; if doubles his strength, divide him, if equally matched you may engage him; if weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing; if the enemy is strong and I am weak, I temporarily withdrew and do not engage.
• Other conditions being equal, if a force attacks one ten times its size, the result is flight.
• In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power.
• There are circumstances in war when many cannot attack few, and others when the weak can master the strong. One able to manipulate such circumstances will be victorious.
• All warfare is based on deception.
• … When capable, feign incapacity, when active, inactivity.
• When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near.
• Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.
• Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.
• I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths.
• When he pretend to flee, do not pursue.
• Do not gobble proffered baits.
• Sometimes drive a wedge between a sovereign and his ministries; on other occasions separate his allies from him. Make them mutually suspicious so that they drift apart. Then you can plot against them.
• Do not allow your enemies to get together ... Look into the matters of his alliances and cause them to be severed and dissolved.
• Plans and projects for harming the enemy are not confined to any one method. Sometimes entice his wise virtuous men away so that he has no counselors. Or send treacherous people to wreck his administration. Sometimes use cunning deceptions to alienate his ministers from the sovereign. Or send skilled craftsmen to encourage his people to exhaust their wealth. Or present him licentious musicians and dancers to change his customs. Or give him beautiful women to bewilder him.
• Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he doesn’t expect you.
• Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its very move … An army without secret agent is exactly like a man without eyes or ears.
• Of all those in the army close to the commander none is more intimate than the secret agent …
• The first essential is to estimate the character of the spy to determine if he is sincere, truthful, and really intelligent … Afterwards, he can be employed … Among agents there are some whose only interest is in acquiring wealth without obtaining the true situation of the enemy, and only meet my requirements with empty words. In such a case I must be deep and subtle.
• There is no place where espionage is not used.
• He who is not sage and wise, humane and just cannot use secret agents. And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them.
• And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things.
• Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.
• Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy … Attack plans at their inception. The supreme excellence in war is to attack the enemy’s plans.
• Generally, the commander must thoroughly acquaint himself beforehand with the maps so that he knows dangerous places … All these facts the general must store in his mind: only then will he not lose the advantage of the ground.
• Therefore, to estimate the enemy situation and to calculate distances and the degree of difficulty of the terrain so as to control victory are virtues of the superior general.
• Agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement.
• Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle.
• Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient.
• He should be capable of keeping his officers and men in ignorance of his plans.
• Set the troops to their tasks without imparting your designs.
• The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you.
• Therefore, when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.
• He alters his camp-sites and marches by devious routes, and thus makes it impossible for others to anticipate his purpose.
• Attack where he is unprepared: sally out when he does not expect you.Know thy enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered.
• Therefore, when I have won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.
• He alters his camp-sites and marches by devious routes, and thus makes it impossible for others to anticipate his purpose.
• Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one’s strength to be superior to that of his enemy; if they indicate defeat; it is because calculations, one can win; with few one cannot. How much less the chance of victory has one who makes none at all. By this means I examine the situation and the outcome will be clearly apparent.
• He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him.
• Therefore I say: know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself your chances of winning or losing are equal.
• If you are ignorant of the enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.
• Therefore, when those experienced in war move they make no mistakes, when they act, their resources are limitless.
• And to control many is the same as to control few. This is a matter of formations and signals.
• Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization.
• In the tumult and uproar, the battle seems chaotic, but there is no disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated.
• In battle all appears to turmoil and confusion. But the flags and banners have prescribed arrangements; the sounds of cymbals, fixed rules.
• Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness of strength.
• Anger his general and confuse him.
• … if the general is choleric his authority can easily be upset. His character is not firm.
• If the enemy’s general is obstinate and prone to anger insult and enrage him, so that he will be irritated and confused, and without a plan will recklessly advance against you.
• If a general is unable to control his impatience and orders his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, one third of them will be killed without taking the city.
• It is the business of a general to be serene and inscrutable, impartial and self-controlled.
• … if serene he is not vexed; if self controlled, not confused.
• By command I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage and strictness.
• If wise, a commander is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expediently. If sincere, his men will have no doubt of the certainty of rewards and punishments.
• If humane, he loves mankind, sympathizes with others, and appreciates their industry and toil. If courageous, he gains victory by seizing opportunity without hesitation. If strict, his troops are disciplined because they are thawe of him and are afraid of punishment.
• Therefore a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and doesn’t demand it of his subordinates.
• … experts in war depend especially on opportunity and expediency. They do not place the burden of accomplishment on their men alone.
• The general must rely on his ability to control the situation to his advantage as opportunity dictates. He is not bound by established procedures.
• He ponders the dangers inherent in the advantages, and the advantages inherent in the danger.
• By taking into account the favorable factors, he makes plan feasible, by taking into account the unfavorable he may resolve the difficulties.
• … if I wish to take advantage of the enemy I must perceive not just the advantage in doing so but must first consider the ways he can harm me if I do.
• Advantage and disadvantage are mutually reproductive. The enlightened deliberate.
• If I wish to take advantage of the enemy, I must perceive not just the advantage in doing so but must first consider the ways he can harm me if I do. Now the valiant can fight; the cautious defend, and the wise counsel. Thus there is none whose talent is wasted.
  

Clausewitz (1780 – 1831)

• “efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed to take adequate account of the endless complexities involved. As we have seen, the conduct of war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual practices.”
• “They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities …”
• “They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites …”
• “… the very nature of interaction is bound to make it unpredictable”
• “Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory and conflicts with practice.”
• “… for in the art of war experience counts more than any amount of abstract truths.”
• … We also want to make it clear that war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues irrespective of the means it employs … Do political relations between peoples and their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged?
• The conduct of war has nothing to do with making guns and powder out of coal, sulphur, saltpeter, copper and tin; its given quantities are weapons that are ready for use and their effectiveness. Strategy uses maps without worrying about trigonometric surveys; it doesn’t inquire how a country should be organized and a people trained and ruled in order to produce the best military results. It takes these matters as it finds them in the European community of nations, and calls attention only to unusual circumstances that exert a marked influence on war.
• One would not want to consider the whole business of maintenance and administration as part of the actual conduct of war. While it may be in constant interaction with the utilization of the troops, the two are essentially very different.
• When whole communities go to war – whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples – the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War therefore is an act of policy. Policy … will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.
• … War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried out by other means. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.
• Politics is the womb in which war develops – where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.
• War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.
• No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.
• He [the belligerent] would act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose.
• The size and variety of factors to be weighed, and the uncertainty about the proper scale to use are bound to make it far more difficult to reach the right conclusion.
• Everything is governed by a supreme law, the decision of arms …
• … The violent resolution of the crisis, the wish to annihilate the enemy’s forces, is the first-born son of war.
• When we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered.
• If we abandon the weak impressions of abstract concepts for reality, we will find that an active, courageous, and resolute adversary will not leave us time for long-range intricate schemes; but that is the very enemy against whom we need these skills most.
• When one force is a great deal stronger than the other, an estimate may be enough. There will be no fighting: the weaker side will yield at once.
• Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed.
• None of this is meant to say that there should be any less activity in warfare. Tools are there to be used, and use will naturally wear them out. Our only aim is clarity and order; we are opposed to bombastic theories that hold that the most overwhelming surprise, the fastest movement or the most restless activity cost nothing; that they are rich mines which lie unused because of the generals’ indolence. The final product may indeed be compared to that of gold and silver mines; one looks only at the end result and forgets to ask about the cost of the labor that went into it.
• The immediate object of an attack is victory.
• The destruction of the army of the enemy is the key to his defeat.
• In war, the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the destruction of his fighting forces the means.
• Victory alone is not everything – but is it not, after all what really counts?
• We doubt whether Bonaparte in any of his campaigns ever took the field without the idea of crushing the enemy in the very first encounter.
• The best strategy is always to be very strong: first in general, and then at decisive point … there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces concentrated.
• An impartial student of modern war must admit that superior numbers are becoming more decisive with each passing day. The principle of bringing the maximum possible strength to the decisive engagement must therefore rank rather higher than it did in the past.
• Superior numbers, far from contributing everything, or even a substantial part, to victory, may actually be contributing very little, depending on the circumstances.
• It would be seriously misunderstanding our argument, to consider numerical superiority as indispensable to victory; we merely wished to stress the relative importance.
• If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two factors, viz, the means at his disposal [i.e., primarily his number of troops] and the strength of his will [i.e., primarily his motivation to fight but actually all other non-material elements of power]. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter – though not exclusively – of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.
• … Plans and orders issued for appearances only, false reports designed to confuse the enemy … should not be considered as a significant independent field of action at the disposal of the commander.
• It is very rare therefore that one state surprises another, either by an attack or by preparations for war.
• Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain …
• To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with the scale of the deception. Normally they call for more than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the desired effect. It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time merely to create an illusion; there is always the risk that nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be available when they are needed.
• Plans and orders issued for appearances only, fake reports designed to confuse the enemy, etc. – have as a rule so little strategic value that they are used only if a ready-made opportunity presents itself. They should not be considered as a significant independent field of action at the disposal of the commander.
• … The weaker the forces that are at the disposal of the supreme commander, the more appealing the use of cunning becomes. In a state of weakness and insignificance, when prudence, judgment and ability no longer suffice, cunning may well appear the only choice. The bleaker the situation, with everything concentrating on a single desperate attempt, the more readily cunning is joined to daring. Released from all future considerations, and liberated from thoughts of later retribution, boldness and cunning will be free to augment each other to the point of concentrating a faint glimmer of hope into a single beam of light which may yet kindle a flame.
• … The wish to achieve surprise is common and, indeed, indispensable and while it is true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard surprise as a key element of success in war. The principle is highly attractive in theory, but in practice it is often held up by the friction of the whole machine.
• Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in tactics time and space are limited in scale. Therefore in strategy surprise becomes more feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult, the more it approaches the higher levels of policy.
• … Surprise has lost its usefulness today.
• The difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected.No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And thorough to the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great pivot in war.
• The very nature of interactions is bound to make it unpredictable.
• The deduction of effect from cause is often blocked by some insuperable extrinsic obstacle: the true causes may be quite unknown.
• Bonaparte was quite right when he said that Newton himself would quail before the algebraic problems it could pose.
• Fiction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. Action in war is like moving in a resistant element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.